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FINANCE IN A SOCIALIST TRANSITION : THE CASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
VIET NAM (1955-1964) 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent f a r - r e a c h i n g reforms i n the S o c i a l i s t Republic of Viet Nam (SRV) have 
been given some—but i n s u f f i c i ë n t — a t t e n t i o n by o u t s i d e obse rve r s and 
s c h o l a r s . These reforms , which concern p a r t i c u l a r l y f i n a n c i a l and monetary 
p o l i c i e s and which a r e de-emphasizing the dominant r o l e of the S t a t e i n t h e 
development p rocess , r a i s e ques t ions about the func t ion ing of the s o c i a l i s t 
economie system t h a t a l r eady da t e s back t o the years i t has been e s t a b -
l i s h e d i n the North , in t h e Democratie Republic of Viet Nam (DRV) dur ing 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
This a r t i c l e ana lyses the r o l e of f inance in t h a t e a r l y t r a n s i t i o n t o 
s o c i a l i s m , t a k i n g the per iod 1955-1964 , i . e . from the Geneva t r e a t y u n t i l 
the f i r s t US-bombing r a i d s on the North , as the "founding" p e r i o d . Other 
s c h o l a r s have s t u d i e d in depth t h e land reform , the c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n and 
the development of a g r i c u l t u r e in the DRV. The impor tant r o l e of the DRV 
S t a t e as " c e n t r e of accumulat ion" and the f i n a n c i a l and monetary p o l i c i e s 
which were developed t o suppor t a S t a t e c o n t r o l l e d accumulat ion process , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y dur ing t h e s e years of r e l a t i v e peace , remain l a r g e l y 
u n r e s e a r c h e d . Only some c l a s s i c s t u d i e s l i k e Chau [1966] ,Tr i [1967] and 
Lava l l ee [1971] have made c o n t r i b u t i o n s in t h i s r e s p e c t . This a r t i c l e t h e r e -
fo re a t tempts t o f i l l pa r t of the gap t h a t e x i s t s in our knowledge of t h i s 
very i n t e r e s t i n g t r a n s i t i o n pe r iod i n t h e DRV. 
The m a t e r i a l p resen ted i s not only f a s c i n a t i n g from the po in t of view 
of economie h i s t o r y , i t w i l l prove t o be i n t e r e s t i n g as well for a b e t t e r 
unders tand ing of c u r r e n t a t t empts t o change and improve t h e system of 
economie and f i n a n c i a l management in the SRV. : t i s fur thermore w r i t t e n with 
a comparative i n t e r e s t in mind. I t may r a i s e some c r u c i a l i s s u e s for those 
2 
studying ( or being involved in ) other more recent t r ans i t i ona l economies 
and as such i t raay contr ibute to the development of more theore t ica l and 
empirical work on the i r speci f ic problems. 
The a r t i c l e i s divided into five sections .F i r s t ,the development of 
State budget i s analysed which gives us insight in the increasing ro le of 
the Sta te as a motor of development and s o c i a l i s t tranformation; Second , 
investment policy i s discussed with par t icu la r reference to the a l loca t ion 
of resources for investment between industry and agr icu l tu re ; Third , the 
complicated issue of monetary policy and the ro le of money and cred i t are 
JU 
analysed; Fourth , a sect ion i s devoted to accumulation and i t s sources of 
finance , both in te rna l and external of o r ig in . The f i f th and f ina l sect ion 
presents the conclusions. The a r t i c l e i s foliowed by a detai led annex on the 
(mis)use of s t a t i s t i c s on indus t r i a l investments in the DRV. 
STATE FINANCE IN THE DRV :1955-64 
On the basis of a great number of fragmented f igures , combined with growth 
indices and shares of sectora l d i s t r i bu t ion , the present author has made a 
reconstruct ion of the DRV State budget for the years 1955-1964. I t remains a 
' recons t ruc t ion ' with a considerable amount of es t imates , as the actual 
figures for most years have not been published. However, i t gives important 
information on the increasing ro l e of the Sta te budget.as a major instrument 
of d i s t r ibu t ion of the National Income , and at the same time on the ^hanges 
in sources of revenue and items of expenditure. The reconstructed State 
budget i s presented in Table 1 , given in current prices and measured in 
mil l ions of Bong. 
Table 1 
Some general observations can be made before discussing the development of 
budgetary revenue and expenditure in detail. First ,the budget increasingly 
became the main distributor of National Income. While government expenditure 
in 1955 (462 million B ) was not more than 17.6 % of National Income , in 
Table I rEs t ima ted revenue and expend i tu re of the 
Tota l revenue 
a ) Domestic revenue 
-^Taxes 
-Industry/Commerce 
- A g r i c u l t u r e 
-Other 
-•Receipts from S t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s 
-Other revenue 
b) Externa l revenue (f oreign a i d ) 
1955 1956 
495 824 
300 489 
244 310 
86 154 
152 126 
6 30 
32 130 
23 49 
196 335 
Total expendi tu re 462 766 
a)Economic c o n s t r u e t i o n 184 384 
-^Industry • 13 115 
-Agr i cu i cu re 33 69 
- C o n s t r u e t i o n - 9 
-PTT/Transport 113 126 
-Other 25 65 
b)Soc ia l a f f a i r s & c u l t u r e 45 94 
-^Education 13 36 
--Health 9 25 
- S o c i a l s e c u r i t y „ » , , 
-Housing • • • • 
-Other expend i tu re , . • B 
c)Def ence 123 159 
d )Adminis t ra t ion 67 77 
e)Miscel leneous expendi tu re 44 52 
DRV S t a t e Budget:1955-1964(Curre 
1957 1958 1959 1960 196 
851 913 1200 1439 159 
529 678 987 1187 131 
289 300 342 341 3o 
165 . ^ • * • • 28 
94 101 112 101 10 
30 . . . . 
8iib 213 336 627 90 
27 42 18 35 2 
322 235 214 252 27 
829 893 1130 14603 156 
440 498 671 884 94 
119 130 219 . . . 
55 66 92 • • . 
11 11 22 • . . 
77 86 122 • • . 
178 205 216. • • # 
96 103 1191 199 22 
35 37 43 • • . 
27 26 3 5 i • • . a 
. . 19 2 7 k 10K 
4 
200 
42? . 
52 k 
170 173 226 23 
77 82 88 87 8 
46 38 52 64 6 
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Main sources : 
-Nam Nam..(1960), pp.73,77,78 . 
-Vo Nhan Tri(1967) ,pp.257,350, 353,464. 
-V.S.Rastorguyev(1965), pp.32,33,46 . 
-Etudes Vietnamiennes(1976),pp.231~233 . 
-Report to the National Assembly of the DRV by Finance Minister Hoang 
Anh;VNA-report, 12/4/60, BBCW53, 20/4/60, B/31 . 
-Nhan Dan , 31/10/1963 , p.1 . 
-Nhan Dan , 3/3/1964, p .3 . 
Notes (Table 1): 
(Revenue and Expenditure f igures for 1955-1959 are based on the f i r s t main 
source, noting that Vo Nhan Tri gives different figures (in shares and 
growth indices) pa r t i cu l a r ly for the years T955 and 1956. On the basis of 
h is data the figures for these years would l i e 5-6 % lower than estimated 
here.The f i r s t source i s used for i t s overal l consistency. Rastorguyev, who 
i s c i t ing the same Vietnamese sources comes to comparable shares and indices 
for the years 1957-1959, with only s l igh t di f ferences . The absolute data for 
1955-1959 are based on the combination of shares and indices with absolute 
figures for 1959 given by Finance Minister Hoang Anh. The 1960-1963 es -
timates are based on Tri ( who uses So Lieu Thong Ke(1963) as source).The 
d i f f i cu l t year i s 1960, mainly because figures were revalued l a t e r on. The 
absolute f igures are again est imated, using the published f igures for 1962. 
The r e l a t i o n between the two halves of the decade i s complicated because the 
above mentioned sources do not agree e n t i r e l y . ) 
Hoang Anh mentioned that for 1960 the planned (balanced) budget figures 
were se t at a t o t a l of 1,448.8 mil l ion Böng. 
According to Y ..Nakano (1963) ,P .219, "income from enterpr ises and works" 
would have been 804 mil l ion Bong and "tax revenue" 335 mil l ion B (1960). 
CY.Nakano(1963), pp.219-220, gives absolute figures for 1961 and presents 
them as being the actual ( real ized) ones. They a r e , however, not more than 
the planned figures (see also Le Chau (1966) , p.366, who gives the same 
figures as planned ones using Nghien Cuu Kinh Te, nr.1,1961 as or ig inal 
source) . Nakano's f igures provide us with the planned f igures on "income 
from enterpr ises and works" (948 mill ion Bong), "tax revenue" (398 mil l ion 
.Bong) and t o t a l expenditure (1,690 mil l ion B). 
For 1955-^1957 the agr icu l tu ra l tax revenue (as shares) were given by our 
main sources. f o r ' the period 1955-1959 as a whole more information was 
provided by Le Chau(1966), p.205 ( shares of t o t a l revenue) and Kinh Te 
Viet Nam (1960),p.126 (shares of domestic revenue). These figures are 
en t i r e ly consis tent with each o ther , and possibly the former are derived 
from the l a t t e r . F o r the following years of the decade the f igures on 
ag r i cu l tu ra l tax payments are calculated in an en t i r e ly d i f ferent way, 
namely as a given share of gross agr icu l tu ra l output (See: Rastorguyev, 
(1965),p.46 and Nhan Dan, 3/3/1964).For the years 1955, 1957 and 1959 an 
in te res t ing cross check was produced in t h i s way which gave only sligh^ 
differences: 147 mil l ion Bong (1955); 96 mil l ion B (1957) and 109 mil l ion B 
(1959); 
®V.S.Rastorguyev(1965),p.35 : 17.6 % of t o t a l S ta te revenue. 
The planned f igure for a balanced budget for 1963 was 1,779.3 mil l ion Bong 
;(See: Nhan Dan ,9/5/1963, p . 2 ) . 
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60nly a planned f igure can be given here; (See: Rastorguyev(1965), with as 
. o r i g i n a l source Nhan Dan, 5/4/1964 ) . 
Calculated on the basis of d i s t r ibu t ion shares given by Etudes 
.Vietnamiennes(1976),pp.231-233 • 
ïA VNA-report gave an absolute f igure on t h i s that presents again a valuable 
cross check of our es t imates . I t sa id "more than 116 mil l ion Bong";(See: 
.VNA-report, 15/2/1960, BBCW45, 24/2/1960, B/20-21. 
Figures on expenditure for social secur i ty were given by VNA-report, 
k30/4/1962, BBCW160, 9/5/1962, B/27 . 
For 1960 a planned as well as a rea l ized f igure for "housing construction" 
was published. Plan : 47 mil l ion Bong (VNA-report ,28/10/1960, BBCW82 
,9/11/1960, B/17) ; Realized : 52 mil l ion Bong (VNA-report, 1/5/1961 
,BBCW108 ,10/5/1961, B/33 ) . In an ea r l i e r radio report the planned f igure 
had been set at 45 mil l ion Bong, which was said to be 4.5 times the 1959 
t o t a l . (Ha-^noi H/S ,3/5/1960 .BBCW57, 18/5/1960 ,B/2 ) . 
Harmoi H/S-report ,31/1/64 ,BBCW253 , 4/3/1964 ,B/30 . 
"Defence" and "Administration" together are 357 mil l ion Bong. No separate 
shares are known to the present author. 
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1964 i t had grown (1874 mil l ion 9) to 43.0 %. Second , t o t a l budgetary 
revenue increased during the period with a factor 3.8 and budgetary expendi-
ture with a factor 4.1 .Third , programmes of economie construction 
(pa r t i cu la r ly in industry) soun becarne dominant in the budget , increasing 
from 184 mill ion B in 1955 to 1168 mil l ion B in 1964. 
Internal and external revenue 
The main sources of revenue on the Sta te budget were : taxes , r eee ip t s frem 
State enterpr ises and foreign a id . All three are discussed separately below. 
F i r s t l y ,Tax revenue from agr icu l ture (thue nong nghiep),coming mainly 
out of the paddy harvest and paid in kind .decreased rapidly in importance 
in the budget as source of domestic revenue (152 mil i ion B), going from 30.7 
% of t o t a l revenue (or 50.5 % of domestic revenue) in 1955 to a level of 
only 111 mil l ion B or 6 % ( r e sp . 7.9 %) in 1964( see Table 1) . The drop 
from 1955 to 1956 ,when land reform was at i t s height ,can only par t ly be 
read from the budget accounts,as prices increased so that in r e a l i t y tax 
payments In kind decreased much fas ter in r e l a t i v e terms. Only through 
increased government purchase was food d i s t r i bu t ion in the urban areas and 
the food de f i c i t of rura l areas not too much affected . 
Tax ra tes varied between 7 % and 37 % of the estimated output per capi ta 
production ( i . e . tax on estimated income in kind) , while i t was l imited to a 
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mere 7 % when also indus t r i a l crops were grown .In r e a l i t y tax revenues 
from agr icu l ture varied as share of gross agr icu l tu ra l output between 4.5 % 
and 4.9 % .However agr icu l tu ra l tax in kind on paddy production decreased 
from 1957 onwards in absolute terms , while quota and above-quota sa les to 
the S ta te increased. In 1958 as well as in 1963 (both af ter ra ther bad 
harvests ) tax ra tes were fixed for a period of three years , which par-
t i c u l a r l y in the l a t t e r year had posi t ive incentive effects for the 
producers .Total paddy procurement in 1964 ( the l a s t year of the period of 
' r e l a t i v e peace') would be subs tan t i a l ly higher than in the forego ng years 
7 
of the decade, because of tax- and quota fixing and the increases in govern-
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ment purchasing prices of October 1963 .However, one should rea l i ze that 
the per capita production of paddy in 1964 was below that of the level of 
1955, for which of course the rapid population growth of about 3.5 % per 
annum i s an important underlying explanation. 
In October 1959 ,when the cooperativization movement was in fu i l swing, 
agr icu l tu ra l tax became discriminatory against)peasants who had not (yet) 
entered the low-level cooperatives ( s t i l l based on pr ivate property of land) 
,giving cooperative members a reduction up to 40-50 % of the regular tax 
r a t e s . Tax co l lec t ion within the low-level cooperatives was s t i l l done on an 
individual basis because pr ivate ownership of land continued. This made 
administration very complex, because for every cooperative member tax had to 
be calculated for the par t icu la r land rented out to the cooperative and for 
his private p lo t . The cooperative i t s e l f paid to the State taxes on owner-
less land, communal land as well as on virgin land (if the period of 
exemption of three to five years had expired).Tax ra tes were not unified for 
a l l low-level cooperatives, nor for the high-level ones (based on col lec t ive 
property of land) and d i spa r i t i e s due to low-echelon ( d i s t r i c t . v i l l a g e or 
hamlet) policy differences were s u b s t a n t i a l , leading to disincentives and 
inequa l i t i es that are nowadays recognized. There were also differences 
between the del ta and the highlands, cooperatives in the l a t t e r regions 
being somewhat favoured with lower tax r a t e s . Final ly , only a very small 
percentage of the tax payments could be withheld by the cooperatives them-
selves for the i r accumulation funds ( o f f i c i a l l y 3 % in the low-level coops 
and 5 % in the high-level ones) .Agricultural tax col lec t ion was somewhat 
simplified when the low-level cooperatives became high-level uni ts , where 
only taxes on the private plot were s t i l l paid on an individual bas i s . 
Agriculture was also taxed in an indi rec t way through low procurement prices 
,with prof i t s rea l ized in processing ag r i cu l tu ra l materials and in foreign 
t ransact ions . Agricultural procurement (including tax payments ,quota and 
above-quota sales to the S ta te ) measured in (low) o f f i c i a l prices tends 
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therefore to underestimate the r e l a t i v e importance of agr icu l ture in produc-
ing resources for accumulation.Although the State would lose money in i t s 
d i s t r ibu t ion of food products against s t ab le low prices (the price of 1 kg 
of r i c e would hardly change in nearly 25 yea r s ) , in t h i s way i t was able to 
keep rea l wages in the urban indus t r i a l areas very low indeed, which i t saw 
as an important asset in the i ndus t r i a l i za t ion d r ive . 
Tax on industry and trade (thue cong thuong nghiep) was paid by enterpr ises 
in different forms. S t a t e , j o in t S ta te-pr iva te ,coopera t ive and private i n -
dus t r i a l , t rade and t ransport companies paid a business tax on gross 
r e c e i p t s , in which pa r t i cu la r ly the rapidly expanding State sector became an 
important source of tax" revenue. There was a d i f ferent ia ted scale for 
branches and s ec to r s . Industry and the construction sector had a ra te of 
only 2 %,while machine-repair un i t s paid 5 % . Cooperative and Sta te s tores 
paid 2.5 % and. trade enterpr ises 7 %. Some enterpr ises such as banks, the 
a i r l i n e service and postal services were exempted from t h i s form of 
taxat ion . 
Commodity tax (thue hang hoa) was levied on a number of—mostly non-
essential—commodities, at ra tes varying between 5~50 %. Raw mater ials 
,means of production and somebasic necess i t i es were exempted or the i r tax 
r a t e s were very low. State enterpr ises paid t h i s tax on the basis of the 
government purchasing price or the production cos t , pr iva te individuals 
9 paid on the basis of free-market prices . Joint S ta te -pr iva te 
,cooperat ive(non-agricul tural) and pr ivate enterpr ises paid a lso a progr es -
sive income tax on business a c t i v i t i e s . These tax ra tes varied for indust ry , 
construction and t ransport from 8-4Q % of p rof i t s and for trade between 10 
and 50 $ ,c lear ly showing the use of tax as an instrument to cont/ol the 
a c t i v i t i e s of pa r t i cu la r ly the private sector in order to avoid a spon-
10 
taneous tendency towards capitalism . As the pr ivate and j o in t S t a t e -
private sectors were rapidly declining in s i z e , t h i s part of tax revenue 
l o s t i t s r e l a t i v e importance from the ear ly 1960s. 
With the tax reforms of December 1959 the handicraft cooperatives were 
allowed to a l loca te 20-25 % of t h i s income tax for the i r accumulation funds. 
9 
Small t raders were confronted with a tax on peddlers which was 5 % for farm, 
fores t ry and mineral products and 7 % for other products. If, however , a 
peasant—and very l ike ly h is wife— would peddle nis (or her) own products 
,no tax was required. 
F ina l ly , there were taxes on alcohol ( pr ivate production was o f f i c i a l l y 
forbidden in December 1959 , but remained widespread) , s a l t and on the 
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slaughter of l ives tock 
Secondly , rece ip ts from enterpr ises and undertakings (thu tu xi nghiep 
va su nghiep)- rapidly increased in importance and became from 1958/1959 
onwards the biggest s ingle .source of revenue on the budget. 
In the ear ly years of the post-1951) decade the State enterprises— s t i l l not 
many in number— f e i l d i rec t ly under the budget, i . e . the budget provided 
a l l the necessary funds for investment and working c a p i t a l . The budget 
received a l l the prof i t s and covered a l l l o s ses , a complete form of 
'adminis t ra t ive management' that would l a t e r be par t ly replaced by the 
introduction of principles of economie accounting (khozraschet) that created 
economie r e l a t ions based on contracts and plan ta rge t s agreed upon between 
enterpr ises and State f inancial agencies.From 1960 t h i s system was i n t r o -
duced ,although i t i s questionable if in pract ice i t was r ea l ly implemented 
at a l l . 
State enterprises had to transfer on a regular basis a certain proportion of 
their planned profits, and furthermore were obliged to create depreciation 
funds for transfer to the budget—on the basis of original purchase rather 
than replacement values— .and to return all surplus working capital. With 
minor exceptions payments of enterprises had to be done through the National 
Bank ,a practice which was generally dodged , keeping large amounts of cash 
12 in order to operate faster in purchasing material supplies 
Receipts from State enterprises increased from a mere 6.5 % of total budget 
revenue (32 million B) in 1955 to even 62.8 % in 1961 (1177 million B). This 
is however not specifying which sector was responsible for the creation or 
1 3 
realization of this budget revenue . A study published in the Vietnamese 
scientific journal Nghien Cuu Kinh Te (Economie Research) in 1963 gives 
10 
us in t e res t ing ins ights into the d i s t r ibu t ion of prof i t and tax ( la i va 
thue) remittances to the budget , in the Vietnamese economie terminology 
often equated with accumulation ( t ien luy ) . I t reported that the commer— 
c i a l sec to r , domestic and foreign t rade , provided more than half of the 
remittances of Sta te enterpr ises to the budget. In 1959 t h i s was respec-
t ive ly 26.7 % and 35.9 % of the t o t a l while industry provided not more than 
20.3 % • The i ndus t r i a l i za t i on programme increased indus t ry ' s contr ibut ion , 
in 1961 ( the l a s t year reported in the study) t h i s was already 31.0 %t 
but s t i l l both t rade sectors provided for nearly half , r e s p . 25.1 % and 23.5 
* '
4
. 
One has to r e a l i z e furthermore that ce r ta in ly not a l l indust r ies were in 
fact making p r o f i t s . There were some highly prof i tab le indust r ies ,notably 
in the l igh t indus t r i a l sec tor , while other indust r ies were producing 
with great l o s se s , due to high investment cos t s , low efficiency and low 
labour product iv i ty . This probably does not apply to the mining industry 
that exploited the country 's r ich coal f ie lds in the Hong-gai/Cam-pha bas-
s i n , which in sp i t e of similar problems was brihging in a subs tan t ia l part of 
the foreign exchange earnings. 
Thirdly ,Foreign aid was an important external source of revenue, 
nearly exclusively coming from the s o c i a l i s t countries , in the 1955-1964 
decade in nearly equal shares mostly provided by China and the Soviet Union. 
I t was crucia l in several ways. In the budget accounts (see Table 1) foreign 
finance i s around 23.8 % of t o t a l revenue for the years 1955-1964. There are 
however strong arguments for assuming t h i s share to be higher in r e a l i t y . 
Imported capi ta l and consumer goods were sold on the domestic market by 
State owned foreign trade corporations ,p rof i t s made in these t ransact ions 
being transfered d i r ec t ly to the budget as domestic revenue within the item 
15 
' r ece ip t s of enterpr ises and undertakings' . . Furthermore the exchange ra t e s 
reported (that ce r ta in ly differ from the exchange ra t e s used in the bargain-
ing processes) of the Rouble (USSR) and ¥uan (China) a lso underestimates the 
rea l value of foreign a id . Last ly , amounts of . oreign aid ( in grants and 
11 
longaterm loans) published by the a u t h o r i t i e s . i n the national currency or in 
1 fi Roubles , are far larger than the published shares of budgetary revenue 
The issue of government bonds to a t t r a c t savings played only a small 
r o l e . What would become a more and more non-budgetary form of investment 
finance was bank c red i t ( since 1960) , which i t s e l f was made possible by 
rapid money creat ion ( and insuf f ic ien t ly by indivldual deposits) , con-
t r ibu t ing to inf la t ionary pressures (see below). 
Budgetary expenditure 
In government expenditure five functional groups appear on the budget : 
economie construction (kien t h i e t kinh t e ) , social and cu l tura l expenditure 
(xa hoi , van hoa), defence (quoc phong), administrat ive management (quan ly 
hanh chinh) and other items (cac khoan khae). 
The la rges t item on the budget, expenditure for 'economie construct ion ' 
shows also the most rapid growth , from 39.8 % of t o t a l expenditur-e in 1955 
to 62.3 % in 1964 (see Table 1) . This expresses the fundamental change in 
the s t ruc tu re of the economy and the growing importance of the Sta te sec to r , 
both in terms of i t s s ize (with an rapidly increased wage-bill as well) and 
in investment programmes financed through the budget for economie expansion 
(see below). For example in State industry alone the number of workers and 
c i v i l servants grew from a mere 21,200 in 1955 to 126,700 in 1960, rcaching 
the tenfold revel of the 1955 f igure at the end of the FFYP , namely 221,300 
in 1965 1 T . 
In the item 'economie construct ion ' i t i s necessary to note that a succes-
si vely growing share i s not speci f ied . Possible expenditures are l i ke ly to 
be f i r s t l y the subsidies to consumers ( i t was estimated that in the years 
of the FFYP annually 40 to 50 mil l ion Bong was paid as subsidies to back the 
government's food d i s t r ibu t ion pol ic ies ) , secondly expenditure for defence 
l ike investment in factor ies d i rec t ly or ind i rec t ly producing for defence 
and re la ted research, and th i rd ly emergency expenditure in the case of bad 
harvest , as occurred in the years 1957 , 1960 and 1963. 
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Total expenditure on 'defence' apart from what appears in the budget ac-
counts i s in r e a l i t y very hard to es t imate . In the l a t e 1950s and early 
1960s when emphasis on the reuni f ica t ion and l ibe ra t ion s t ruggle in the 
South became overt , more expenditure cer ta in ly must have been rea l loca ted 
to defence than can be seen from the budget accounts . l t i s furthermore 
l i ke ly that most or possibly a l l mi l i ta ry aid from the s o c i a l i s t countries 
did not appear in the budget at a l l . 
F ina l ly , under ' o ther ' expenditure .amortization and in t e r e s t payments of 
long-term loans slowly entered the budget, growing pa r t i cu la r ly during the 
ear ly 1960s, when a l l foreign aid received in the form of long-term loans 
had to be paid back in sp i t e of the very soft conditions under which they 
were granted. 
On the whole---as t r a d i t i o n a l l y in s t a t e s o c i a l i s t economies^- the budget 
f igures show a small surplus ,except those for 1960 , which may be an 
indicat ion of the severe economie c r i s i s that occurred during that year, 
19 with the poorest agr icu l tu ra l performance in years 
INVESTMENT POLICY 
Investment undertaken by the State and mostly realized through budget (no 
interest bearing ) transfers became soon the main engine for economie growth 
in the DRV. The allocation of budgetary investment to economie sectors and 
branches expressed well the factual policy of economie growth which 
developed throughout the decade, not always being in accordance with ex-
pressed policy intentions or ideological conceptions of the leadership. 
Apart from reconstruction of the severe war damage, particulai ly in 
transport and Communications , very soon the build-up of a comprehensive 
(State-run) manufacturing industry became for the North Vietnamese policy 
makers the indispensable element in building socialism . 
Table ?. 
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Table 2 : Budgetary investment in the DRV ,1955-1964 (million Böng) 
Centrally-run Local 
industry industryc 
'Group A Group B 
Agriculture Total budgetary 
I r r iga t ion Other Investraent 
1955 8.1 1.4 0.2 21 .0 1.8 140.5 
1956 56.5 21 .5 1.6 28.9 7.4 260.1 
1957 66.7 37.1 1.2 21.6 5.9 251 .0 
1958 70 .2 44.0 2.4 35.2 12.6 314.0 
1959, 
1960° 
118.5 74.7 5.6 24.5 32.5 494.2 
186.0 62.7 
17 .6 d 
29.3 41.4 659.5 p 
1961 236.8 74.0 49.4 59.7 731.5 
1962 246.6 62.9a 21 .2 72.4 77.0 731.7 
1963 243.5 47 .4 " 19.7 79.4 83-3 714.0 
753.1 1964 279.6 62.3 15.8 110.7 64.0 
Sources : 
-Nam Nam..(1960),pp.99,103 
-So Lieu Thong Ke(1963),pp.17,21,63,64 . 
-Vo Nhan Tri(1967),p.541 . 
-^Tran PhuongO 967), p -1 3 -
Notes : 
Nghien Cuu Kinh Te,nr.16,August 1963,p.81 presents other estimates for 
indus t r i a l investment than given here . However the differences are ra ther 
small . NCKT did not divide these investments for central and local 
i n d u s t r i e s . What i s in te res t ing to note i s furthermore that another source 
informs us that 15.5 % of t o t a l investments in local industr ies went to 
Group A during 1961-1964 ( th i s would become 66.8 % (!) during 1965-1968 
when decent ra l iza t ion was forced because of the escalated war) . See: Etudes 
Vletnamiennes(1976), p.189. See for comparlson the s t a t i s t i c a l note on 
indus t r i a l investment at the end of t h i s a r t i c l e . 
While 1955-1959 data were given in absolute f igures by NNXDKTVH the data 
for 1960 i s est imated. The 1960 plan (at l e a s t in one version) gave: 277.3 
( Group A); 53.5 (Group B); and 6.4 ( local ) ,which i s a doubling of inves t -
ments in group A and an even greater decrease for group B than f i na l l y 
r e a l i z e d . Our estimate comes from SLTK (1963), tha t gave as 'adjusted ' 
f igure for overal l investment 659.5 mill ion Bong and the subsequent shares 
of d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Overall investment for 1961 was o r ig ina l ly réported by VNA as 731-5 mil l ion 
Böng. According to T r i , p.540 , i t should be around 720.2 mil l ion Bong. The 
VNA report gave a share for Group A, probably ( and t h i s goes also for 
Group B) including local industry t oo . The growth ra tes with 1960 as basis 
are not consistent with the shares given. Calculating backwards the 1960 
figures could be ra ther lower. Because of a l l these inconsistencies both 
years must be handled with considerable ca re . 
Etudes Vietnamiennes(1976),p.196 gives a share of 5.6 % for average local 
indus t r i a l investment in the years 1961-64. Hence 1961= 17.6 mi l l ion . 
eHere SLTK(1963)pp.17 and 21, contradict 
47.4 mil l ion Bong, the second comes to 
chosen-seemingly being more r e a l i s t i c . 
each o ther . The f i r s t would give 
40.0 mil l ion Bong. The former i s 
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Tri(1967) ,p.541 .provides shares for 1964 and from the separate growth 
ra tes the t o t a l i s estimated. Rastorguyev( 1965) ,.p .35, gives however 764.7 
mil l ion and Leon Lavallee(1971),P.58 gives 760 mil l ion Song. 
:3 Annees(1959),p.93, gives somewhat different f igures for 1955-1957 : 28.2 
mill ion Bong (1955); 50.1 mil l ion Bong (1956); and 33.3 mil l ion Bong 
(1957).Many f igures in t h i s s t a t i s t i c a l handbook are deviating from l a t e r 
published ones. One factor i s l i ke ly to be the difference in prices used. 
According to Tri(1967) ,p .540, the figures for 1961-64 are also somewhat 
different for investment in ag r i cu l tu r e . If one takes 1960 =100 as base 
year the growth indices and shares of the t o t a l investment in the budget 
are as follows: 1961 :168.2 ( 1 6 . 2 * ) ; 1962 : 220.2 (21.3 %); 1963 : 236.4 
(23.4 %); 1964 : 254.4 (23.0 %); For the year 1962 the share of t o t a l 
budgetary investment of 21.3 % i s also given in SLTK(1963)p.21 ; that 
source confirms the estimates for 1960 in our tab le , but gives for 1963 
another f igure: 22.6$ .All these minor differences are probably caused by 
the revaluat ion of investment data for 1960 which was done in 1963. 
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In Table 2 one can note the explosive growth of investments in industry , 
with an emphasis on the central ly-run producer goods industry (group A). 
There was a rea l 'boom* in investments in t h i s sector from 1959 ,when i t 
received 118.5 mill ion Bong ( a growth of 68.8 % over the previous yea r ) , 
jumping to 186.0 mill ion Bong in 1960 and even 236.8 mill ion Bong in 1961. 
I t i s therefore in te res t ing to note that the ' i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n dr ive ' , ^ 
normally understood to have taken place during the years of the FFYP (1961^-
1965) in fact s t a r t ed e a r l i e r and even saw some stagnation and set-back in 
the midst of the FFYP-period. One of the reasons for the ' la t te r phenomenon 
i s at l e a s t the investment tension that had been caused by simultaneous* 
execution of many indus t r i a l construction s i t e s , often i l l -p lanned and with 
ever increasing gestat ion periods , shortages of construction materials ( 
r e a l and a r t i f i c i a l ) and a subs tan t ia l waste of c a p i t a l . 
Most investments in group A went to the branches of e l e c t r i c i t y , s t ee l and 
cast iron , and chemical production ( in 1963 these branches received 
respect ively 20.8 % , 27.7 % and 11.6 % of t o t a l investments in cen t ra l ly -
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run indust r ies ) . The industr ies producing consumer goods (group B) 
received subs tan t ia l ly l e s s , which i s par t ly because of the i r lower 
capi ta l /output r a t i o , but mainly because these industr ies or handicraft 
cooperatives were neglected within the economie pol icy. Investments did not 
grow after the year 1961 ( a year that on the whole showed a change towards 
more 'pragmatic p o l i c i e s ' ) , they were on average lower during 1961-1964 
than in 1959-1960 ,and in 1963 there was even a major decrease in investment 
in group B. The consequence of t h i s policy was par t ly a growing shortage of 
consumer goods ('goods famine ') . jeopardizing the developing pol ic ies of 
material incentives towards the peasantry.Not only centra l ly-run censumer 
goods indus t r ies lagged behind, a lso the regional / local industr ies—in 
majority set-=up during the years 1959-1963 and important producers of 
agr icu l tu ra l implements and of consumer goods— only received a small piece 
of the investment p i e . 
One of the policy items that time and again was s t ressed in leading s t a t e -
ments was that of a "mixed choice of techniques", in which modern techniques 
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—MOStly introduced in centra l ly-run heavy indus t r i e s , ex is t next to simpler 
semi-mechanized techniques— to be used in small or medium-size indus t r i a l 
en t e rp r i s e s . The idea has much resemblance to the Chinese expression of 
walking on two legs . In the North Vietnamese case t h i s policy was indeed 
adhered to but the s ize of the legs was quite unequal.We have seen that the 
overwhelming part of investment undertaken by the central au thor i t i es went 
to modern industry, and local industries—however large in numbers and 
c ruc ia l ly important— received l i t t l e r ea l a t t en t ion and support from the 
21 State . A fundamental idea that was one of the main underlying factors of 
tïfïs factual policy —par t icu la r ly developing since 1959— was the so-cal led 
"law of p r io r i t y development of producing means of production" (quy luat uu 
t ien phat t r i e n san xuat tu l i eu san xuat) which was subscribed to by the 
North Vietnamese leadersh ip . This t r ad i t i ona l Soviet view that the output of 
the producer goods sector should increase fas te r than that of the consumer 
22 goods sector had already been c r i t i c i z e d by the Chinese in 1956. In 
r e a l i t y , however , the growth of investments in the producer goods sector 
in China during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1959) was even greater than 
before. Par t i cu la r ly the agr icu l tu ra l sector remained heavily under-
cap i ta l ized un t i l the deep economie c r i s i s of 1960-1961 l e f t no other 
a l t e rna t ive than a radica l change, leading to the ' ag r i cu l tu re f i r s t ' 
pol icy . Apart from the i r c r i t i c i sm of the absolute p r io r i t y for heavy in -
dustry , the Chinese introduced also the i r he re t i ca l view on the 'choice of 
techniques*. While i ndus t r i a l i za t i on in the Soviet Union had been based on 
the nearly exclusive choice of modern techniques , the Chinese introduced 
the i r 'walking on two l egs ' policy, combining modern with simple, mostly 
capi ta l -saving techniques. In the case of North Viet Nam , i t has become 
clear that elements of both posi t ions were present in the economie policy 
in tent ions as regards the development of industry ( and impl ic i t ly i t s 
r e la t ionsh ip with a g r i c u l t u r e ) . However, in the f ina l analysis .within the 
overal l impressive growth of investment in the indus t r i a l sec to r , some 
sectors such as the industry producing farm implements, the consumer goods 
industry , the handicraft sector and a lso , at the moment of the i r grea tes t 
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expansion , the local industr ies , lagged behind in accumulation mainly 
because of insuff ic iënt investment a l locat ions i n i t i a t e d by the Sta te .This 
accumulation bias towards State-run modern industry was in fact only par-
t i a l l y adapted towards the end of the decade. 
In r e l a t i o n to the overal l budgetary investment for cap i ta l construction 
industry received an increasing share . During the four years of the FFYP 
2^ t h i s had even grown to 45.3 % of the t o t a l f igure . During the decade the 
indus t r i a l apparatus expanded great ly . s t a r t i ng from scratch with a reported 
number of 19 medium and la rge-sca le en te rp r i ses , 'wh i l e at the end of the 
decade there were more than 1,000 State operated en te rp r i se s , of which more 
24 than 200 were c e n t r a l l y r u n .This was cer ta in ly a great expansion in 
productive capacity (and alsó in output performance in cer ta in branches), 
but i t i s questionable how eff ic iënt these investments were, taken in to 
account many repor ts complaining about underut i l iza t ion and malfunctioning 
of indus t r i a l u n i t s . 
Budgetary investments in agr icu l ture were far l e s s than those in i n -
dustry as we can see from the second part of Table 2. As share of the t o t a l 
. agr icu l tu ra l investment by the State even went down to only 10.7 % of the 
t o t a l in 1960.As a consequence of the poor performance of t h i s sector par-
t i c u l a r l y in that year.policy was adapted somewhat in favour of ag r i cu l tu re , 
pa r t i cu l a r ly through the construction of i r r i g a t i o n and flood-control works-
- e s sen t i a l in a 'wet r i c e cu l tu re ' such as the Vietnamese. However.the rapid 
growth in investment i s overs ta t ing very much the posi t ive effect for the 
agr icu l tu ra l sector as a whole , because an important part of t o t a l inves t -
ments (possibly about half) went to the Sta te farms, which contributed only 
very l i t t l e to the t o t a l gross agr icu l tu ra l product, the i r share varying 
25 between 0.5 % in 1960 and 1.1 % in 1963 . So a seemingly important change 
in the a l locat ion of investments for the agr icu l tu ra l sector was cer ta in ly 
up to the c r i t i c a l year 1963 of only r e l a t i v e signif icance for the major 
production uni ts of the sec to r , the cooperat ives. Only when during 1964-65 a 
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'nation-wide movement for irrigation' was launched a more substantial real-
location took place,although certainly not at the cost of investments in 
heavy industry (see table 2). 
Apart from the public investment as we discussed here, financed dir^ctly by 
the budget, investments in particular in agriculture were growing through 
loans provided by the State Bank or by the credit cooperatives. Investments 
paid out of 'accumulation funds' of the cooperatives or State enterprises 
,not financed by budget transfers or bank loans, were very small in com-
parison with other investments. Agricultural and handicraft cooperatives had 
a minimal accumulation and often did not accumulate at all, while State 
enterprises in industry had very small room to manoeuvre outside the budget 
(and the plan). 
Finally, a more important source was 'labour investment', mostly in the form 
of peasant labour spent on the construction of infrastructural water conser-
vancy works or roads. It is difficult to estimate the overall contribution 
of labour investment. A high estimate for 1961 would lead to about 90 mil-
lion B6ng in that year ,while a low (and probably more realistic) estimate 
for 1963 comes to about 17.5 million Böng as labour investment in agricul-
tural infrastructure. Data is lacking for more accurate estimates in this 
respect 
MONEY AND MONETARY POLICY 
One of the priorities of the DRV government after the reestablishing of 
peace in 1954 was to unify and stabilize the unit of money. A contradiction 
existed between the 'old' liberated areas, with large amounts of muney in 
circulation and relatively few goods to buy, and the 'new' ones in which the 
money stock was much smaller and the amount of goods available greater. New 
money issues were necessary to replace the French controlled Piastre by the 
Böng , to finance part of the budget deficit and to create credit funds for 
the State Ban!'. In an economy still dominated by the private sector, and as 
such for its development dependent on the functioning of market relations, a 
stable unit of currency was obviously very important. On the other hand, it 
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would also be needed for future planning and for the stimulation and control 
of production and distribution 
During the first years of the resistance war, prices of basic necessities 
had skyrocketed, but from the second half of 1951 onwards the price levels 
started to decrease somewhat as a consequence of general improvement of 
product ion, the new credit system and the strengthening of fiscal and 
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monetary polieies after liberation . In 1955 and the first half of 1956, 
prices of basic necessities dropped. But particularly in the urban centres, 
during the second half of 1956 and the first half of 1957, shortages of 
consumer goods combined with speculative activities of certain strata caused 
a rise in prices. 
The quantity of money in circulation had increased rapidly during this 
period for several reasons. Firstly , peasants holding money in cash which 
they had hidden during the land reform in order not to be branded as a kulak 
started to spend this money when the rectificatlon of errors campaign had 
begun( late 1956). Secondly , during 1956 supplementary issue of money had 
been necessary to finance part of the capital construction plans that were 
(according to a Soviet source) "excessively stepped up and did not cor-
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respond to the possibilities that existed at that time" . Thirdly ,Bank 
credits rapidly expanded ,partly financed by note issue, and fourthly , the 
increase of wages in the State sector and the increasing activity of the 
State on the market in agricultural products played a role. While demand for 
consumer goods was rapidly increasing, production was still very limited and 
a large disequilibrium between money in circulation and goods and services 
supplied was emerging. 
During the critical period of early 1957, a number of legal me as u. es and 
changes in economie policy were undertaken to curtail inflation and to 
improve the financial situation of the State.In April of that year, a new 
law against speculation was decreed. The still existing commercial credit 
system run by private lenders was practically banned and payments within the 
State sector were required to be done through bank transfers. Credits to the 
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private sector were heavily cur ta i l ed and the growth in Sta te expenditure 
was slowed down (see Table 1) . 
All these measures contributed pos i t ive ly to the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of prices and 
the reduction of the quantity of money in c i r c u l a t i o n . This would seem to 
indica te a 'monetar is t ' explanation of in f la t ion and i t s r eso lu t ion . 
However, the s t r u c t u r a l incapacity to produce enough consumer goods (and the 
underestimation of the i r importance) was the key to the inf la t ionary 
pressures . The import of large quant i t ies of consumer goods ( while at the 
same time food was exported) in 1957 would only temporarily take off some 
pressure as regards the supply s i d e . 
On the 28th of February 1959, the government deereed a money reform that 
would introducé the (new) Bong against a r a t e 1 (new) Bong = 1,000 (old) B 
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ong . The reasons for t h i s l a rge-sca le monetary reform were p o l i t i c a l as 
well as economie. The economie reasons were ,f i r s t l y , to simplify the uni t 
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of account. The r a t i o 1/1,000 was chosen because : 
an old 1000 dong note ac tua l ly became the basic uni t of accounting in 
t rade ,in the populat ion 's payments, and a lso in the settlement of 
accounts between i n s t i t u t i o n s and en t e rp r i s e s . 
Secondly, by changing the currency and se t t i ng an upper l imi t of 2000 new B 
to the amount of money that could be changed , the State Bank accumulated 
not only knowledge about the t o t a l amount of money in c i rcu la t ion but also 
control over the 'surplus money' that could only be deposited and not 
withdrawn. This reform dealt a heavy blow to a small but wealthy group of 
c a p i t a l i s t fami l ies , maybe not more than around 4,000 in t o t a l . For example 
, in Ha-noi c i t y , these families owned, according to the o f f i c i a l l y published 
s t a t i s t i c s on the money reform, an average of 11,728 (new) Bong, '-'hile a 
public servant only possessed 139 B . Taking the maximum personal l imi t 
into account , i t would mean that about 40 mil l ion Bong was saved forceably 
in t h i s way. I t proved that not only was there an unequal d i s t r ibu t ion of 
money holdings between urban and rura l a reas , namely 36.1 % against 63.9 % 
(while only 9.3 % of the population l ived in the former ) , but within Ha-noi 
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only 3.5 % of the population held 42.1 % of the money!J In the country-side 
i t was noted that about 30 % of the peasants had no money at a l l for 
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transactions.Our estimate would be that on average peasant households at the 
time of the monetary reform had as a ru le l e s s than 10,000 (old) B = 10 
(new) B in cash money to use for t r ansac t ions . 
35 The reform brought also possibly unexpected outcomes. namely : 
In the course of the execution of the monetary reform i t became evident 
that many enterpr ises and i n s t i t u t i o n s did not adhere s t r i c t l y to 
f inancial d i sc ip l ine and had large amounts of cash on hand, often 20 to 
30 mil l ion dong in old notes , representing 10-15 % of the t o t a l 
monetary c i r c u l a t i o n . 
This meant that in sp i t e of the regula t ions , many payments were s t i l l done 
in cash and outside the o f f i c i a l c i r c u i t . The monéy reform reduced the 
accumulated money stocks of -the enterpr ises subs tan t i a l ly , at l e a s t for 
sometime. However, in the end the money reform did not contribute much to a 
lowering of- the r a t e of growth of money in c i r cu l a t i on . In the three years 
1959-1961, which were the years of great indus t r i a l expansion, money c i r -
culat ion expanded even more rapidly than after the changes in economie 
policy in 1957.It was estimated by one source that if 1958 i s taken as a 
base-year (=100) the index for ' t o t a l commodities in society '(hang hoa ban 
Ie xa hoi) in 1962 stood at 129.6 ,while the index for money in c i rcu la t ion 
( t ien t e luu thong) had increased to 146.7. 
During the following year 1963 inf la t ionary pressures increased again.The 
supply side was constrained by poor agr icu l tu ra l performance, but par-
t i c u l a r l y by poor procurement performance. Increases in agr icu l tu ra l 
purchasing prices and subsequent increases in c red i t extensi'ons to Sta te 
t rading organizations gave a r i s e in money in c i r cu l a t i on . In the absence of 
subs tan t ia l growth of supply of commodities to the market, t h i s increased 
37 inf la t ionary pressures . With the general economie improvement in the 
following year, these would somewhat be reduced. 
Banks and cred i t policy 
Already during the res i s tance war against the French the DRV State Bank ( 
founded in 1951) ,as supplier of c redi t and the issuer of money (together 
with the Ministry of Finance), had been transformed in to a governmert i n -
s t i t u t i o n (in the 'maquis') for economie con t ro l . 
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During the res i s tance war, short-term c red i t s had been introduced with the 
issuing of the Bank Bong in order to provide in par t i cu la r domestic t rade 
organizations and pr ivate t raders with working c a p i t a l . Long term cred i t was 
given to peasants but in 1952 i t proved that primarily the r ich peasants 
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were profiting.which led to a ha l t of th i s policy . In the f i r s t three 
years of the post--war decade (1955-1957) c red i t policy was directed towards 
f a c i l i t a t i n g domestic t r a d e . State enterpr ises and organizations were a l l 
budget financed and as such the S ta te provided the investments and the 
working c a p i t a l . The absence of any economie accounting pr inciples led soon 
to problems well-known in other s o c i a l i s t economies, such as the 'aimless 
39 and ineffectual u t i l i z a t i o n of various kinds of c a p i t a l ' . With the in t rod-
uction of some khozraschet pr inciples and the f i r s t s teps on the road to 
i ndus t r i a l i z a t i on during the years 1958-1959 , the necessi ty to create a 
c red i t system that would also reach the indus t r i a l enterpr ises became 
apparent. Until then the Sta te had provided 100 % of the working c a p i t a l , 
but in the domestic and foreign t rade sectors already in 1958 up to 70 % of 
the working cap i t a l was provided through short-term bank c r e d i t . 
The important 14th Plenum of the CC of the -Party in December 1958 decided to 
expand credi t r e l a t i ons between the Sta te Bank and the industry and hand-
ic ra f t s ec to r . Decreasing the burden for the S ta te budget, t ightening 
f inancia l control and increasing efficiency were the main objectives of t h i s 
new pol icy . From February 1959 onwards , the o f f i c i a l norm became tha t 30 % 
of the working capi ta l (in indus t r i a l en terpr i ses) should be financed by 
short-term c r e d i t s . Possibly i t was in pract ice even more than t h a t . By 1960 
the system was generalized , and on the eve of the FFYP the Sta te Bank began 
experiments to give fu l l c red i t s during the i n i t i a l production period of new 
enterpr ises in order to s t imulate production. Although s t i l l the bulk of 
short-term c red i t went to t r a d e , from 1959 onwards industry appeared some-
what more s t rongly in the flow of c r e d i t s . 
The rapid expansion of c red i t s did not proceed, however, without causing 
some subs tan t ia l problems. F i r s t l y , t h i s was because an important part of 
Bank resources for c red i t s was financed by the issue of new notes . Hence, 
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money i n c i r c u l a t i o n grew fas t e r than the volume of commodities in 
c i r c u l a t i o n . Secondly , working c a p i t a l was of ten used in a was tefu l and 
40 i r r a t i o n a l way . I nc reas ing the m a t e r i a l s tocks i n exaggera ted ways was a 
normal phenomenon. Probably a l s o some working c a p i t a l was used for i n v e s t -
ment pur poses . This c o n t r i b u t e d t o e x t r a p r e s s u r e on the a l r eady problemat ic 
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supply of c a p i t a l goods and raw m a t e r i a l s . 
A second f e a t u r e of c r e d i t p o l i c y dur ing the decade i s t h a t the S t a t e and 
coopera t ive s e c t o r s were more and more favoured with bank c r e d i t s , t he 
l a t t e r p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1958, when c o o p e r a t i v i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e and 
h a n d i c r a f t s had begun. From 1957 onwards, c r e d i t s t o the p r i v a t e and j o i n t 
42 S t a t e - p r i v a t e s e c t o r s were c u r t a i l e d or p r a c t i c a l l y cut off . C red i t po l i cy 
by the S t a t e Bank became t h e r e f o r e a powerful ins t rument t o forward t h e 
r a p i d change i n p roduc t ion r e l a t i o n s t h a t took p l a c e . 
However, the po l i cy of the S t a t e Bank towards a g r i c u l t u r e seems t o have 
been—to say t h e l e a s t — v e r y r e s e r v e d . Pham Hüng , member of the P o l i t b u r e a u 
(nowadays s t i l l a very i n f l u e n c i a l f i g u r e in Vietnamese p o l i t i c s ) and 
r e s p o n s i b l e for a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , c r i t i c i z e d ' t h i s a t t i t u t e a t a con-
ference on investment and f i n a n c i a l management i n March 1961. He s a i d t h a t 
from the planned volume of 31 m i l l i o n Bong for the year 1960 he S t a t e Bank 
had only loaned 18 m i l l i o n Bong t o t h e p e a s a n t s . An i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the 
Bank i t s e l f had concluded t h a t t h i s de f i c i ency was caused in the f i r s t p lace 
by the h e s i t a t i o n cadres had shown, f e a r i n g t h a t l oans would not be 
r e c u p e r a t e d , be ing a f r a i d t o ' l o s e S t a t e f u n d s ' . He emphasized the p o l i t i c a l 
t a s k s of the banking system t h a t should more a c t i v e l y and consc ious ly con-
43 duet i t s mob i l i z ing and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l r o l e . 
During 1961-1964 long- term and s h o r t - t e r m c r e d i t s t o t h e coope ra t ive s e c t o r 
i n c r e a s e d by a f a c t o r of 4.6 in r e l a t i o n t o the years 1958-1960. Of the 
t o t a l amount of c r e d i t s the a g r i c u l t u r a l coope ra t ives r ece ived 56.6 %, 
accord ing t o a d e t a i l e d review of the a c t i v i t i e s of the S t a t e Bank in t h e 
DRV. At the end of 1964, long- term c r e d i t s a l r eady accounted for 30 % of t he 
44 f ixed funds of a g r i c u l t u r a l coope ra t ives according t o t h e same source 
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In genera l i t seems t h a t for q u i t e some t i m e , a t l e a s t up t o l a t e 1960, 
c r e d i t po l i cy was seen as of secondary impor tance . I t fol iowed more or l e s s 
the r equ i remen t s s e t by p roduc t ion , but p a r t i c u l a r l y of commerce, i n 
a pa s s ive way. A more conscious and a c t i v e c r e d i t p o l i c y i n which the p r o v i -
s i on of c r e d i t s to economie s e c t o r s could be used t o s t i m u l a t e p roduc t ion 
and t o e x e r c i s e a g r e a t e r c o n t r o l over p roduc t ion and d i s t r i b u t i o n on ly 
s lowly s t a r t e d t o develop a f t e r w a r d s . 
ACCUMULATION AND ITS SOURCES OF FINANCE 
Before d i s c u s s i n g accumulat ion dur ing t h e f i r s t decade i n t h e DRV—in p a r -
t i c u l a r in r e l a t i o n t o i t s sources of f i n a n c e — i t i s necessa ry t o no t e t h a t 
t h e t r ea tmen t of accumulat ion as a concept , handled i n t h e concre te North 
45 Vietnamese con tex t i s — t o say t h e l e a s t — r a t h e r inadequa te . This i s p a r t l y 
due t o a c e r t a i n vagueness i n t h e Vietnamese economie vocabulary , a t l e a s t 
i n t h e o f f i c i a l l l y pub l i shed documents of which t h e p r e s e n t au thor i s aware , 
but even more due t o t h e l o o s e handl ing of the concept by Western s c h o l a r s . 
In s t a t e s o c i a l i s t economies normal ly accumula t ion i s being def ined as ne t 
a d d i t i o n s to f i x e d a s s e t s ( in t h e p rodue t ive sphe re ) , net a d d i t i o n s t o 
working c a p i t a l and i n c r e a s e i n s t o c k s of consumer goods . I f fo re ign sav ings 
a re excluded and Nat iona l Income i s the Net M a t e r i a l Product (NMP) without 
t a k i n g i n t o account the fo re ign s e c t o r , then t h e ' accumula t ion r a t e ' i s 
def ined as the domestic sav ings r a t e of the Produced Nat iona l Income 
(S/Y ).However, i f fo re ign sav ings ( fore ign a id i n g r a n t s and l o a n s ) a r e 
inc luded the accumulat ion i s normally compared with t h e Nat iona l Income 
46 D i s t r i b u t e d ((S+F)/Yd) . 
In s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t i t i s c e r t a i n l y not always c l e a r which concepts 
a r e e x a c t l y being used in Vietnamese economie p u b l i c a t i o n s , one has t o 
47 i n t roducé them i n o rder t o be a b l e t o ana lyse t h e da ta thoroughly . This 
i s done i n t a b l e 3 . 
Table 3 
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Table 3 : 
Nat iona l Income and Accumulation , DRV ; 1957—1964 
(Current p r i c e s , m i l l i o n s of Bong ) 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 • 1962 1963 1964 
Nat iona l Income: 2624a 2869 a 3352a 3362b 3593b 3862b 3931b 4359b 
Accumula t ion(^) : 2 4 . 6 C d 2 0 . 7 C d 1 9 . 1 C d 18 .4 d 18 .4 d 1 7 . 3 d l 6 . 9 d S 1 8 . 1 9 
(Dom. s a v i n g s ) : ( 1 1 . 7 ) ° ( 1 3 - 7 ) C ( 1 3 . 7 ) ° ( 1 0 . 9 ) f ( 1 0 . 7 ) f ( 8 . 1 ) f ( 7 . 3 ) f ( 7 . 3 ) f 
Notes and main sources : 
The f i g u r e s for the years 1957-1959 a r e given by Nam Nam.. (1960) ,p.76 and 
e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d t o be in c u r r e n t p r i c e s ( g i a h ien hanh ) . However, our 
main sources a re d i f f e r i n g c o n s i d e r a b l y he re : 
-3 Annees. .(1959 ) , p . 4 4 , g ives fo r 1957 : 2,590 m i l l i o n B-ong ( "p rov i s iona l 
f i g u r e " , c u r r e n t p r i c e s ) ; 
'j-iNhan Dan ,5/1/1960 , p . 2 r e p e a t s t h i s f i g u r e for 1957 and p r e s e n t s a n o t h e r , 
s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t one for 1959 : 3,356 m i l l i o n Bong ; 
r'Kinh Te Viet Nam(1960) , p .269 comes with aga in a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t 
s e r i e s : 2 ,580 .7 m i l l i o n B (1957); 2 ,892.6 m i l l i o n B (1958) and 3,330.6 
m i l l i o n B (1959) wi thout g iv ing the s o r t of p r i c e s used , whi le d i f f é r ences 
a re l e f t unexp la ined . 
-Le Chau(1966), p.294 and r e p e a t e d by L a v a l l e e ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p .117 used the same 
f i g u r e s as p re sen ted in t a b l e 3, but as being given i n "1957 cons t an t 
p r i c e s " . This must be i n c o r r e c t as t h i s year was never used as b a s i s f o r 
measurement. Lava l l ee comments t h a t i t i s pos s ib ly a ques t ion of a 
p r i n t e r ' s e r r o r ( " c o q u i l l e " ) . However,when growth i n d i c e s a r e used t o 
c a l c u l a t e subsequent y e a r s , even small d e v i a t i o n s c r e a t e r a t h e r s i z e a b l e 
d i f f é r e n c e s i n a b s o l u t e t e r m s . 
^ L a s t l y , Nguyen Tien Hungd977) , s t a t e s (pp. 105,107-8) t h a t Y was given i n 
" cons t an t p r i c e s " , whi le a c t u a l l y r e f e r r i n g t o t h e same sources as used 
h e r e , which e x p l i c i t l y g ive the Nat iona l Income ( thu nhap quoc dan) in 
c u r r e n t p r i c e s . 
Vo Nhan Tri (1967) ,g ives us r a t h e r c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n fo rma t ion . On one and 
the same page growth i n d i c e s for 1960 and 1964 (with r e s p e c t t o 1957) 
appear t o be : 1960=128.1 and 1964=166.1 , whi le for the y e a r s 1957-1963 
the following series is shown (previous year=100): 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
108.58 114.88 102.70 106.9 107.5 101.8 
and f u r t h e r " p r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e s " for the yea r s 1963 and 1964 with r e s p e c t 
t o 1960 : 1963=120.4 and 1964=129.6; F i r s t l y , the growth i n d i c e s for 1957-
1959 a r e not c o n s i s t e n t with the a b s o l u t e f i g u r e s p resen ted by NNXDKTVH 
;Seeondly, t he f i g u r e for Y in 1960 i s c a l c u l a t e d i n t a b l e 3 on the b a s i s 
of i t s comparison with 1957 r a t h e r than 1959. I t i s very u n l i k e l y t h a t i n a 
c r i s i s year such as 1960 Y would grow by 2.7 % over an e x c e p t i o n a l l y good 
year ( ! ) ; T h i r d l y , t he " p r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e " for 19"3 i s not used as i t i s 
much h igher than t h e combined f i g u r e s given i n t h e s e r i e s , aga in for t h e 
r e a s o n t h a t 1963 was a ' b a d ' year ; 
Another s o u r c e : Duong Dinh G i (1978 ) , p . 17 , g ives a somewhat d i f f e r e n t s e t of 
growth i n d i c e s without s p e c i f y i n g which p r i c e s a r e invo lved : 
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1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
100 106.9 118.3 119.7 130.8 137.6 
Hung(1977), pp.105>-113 , p r e s e n t s a s e c t i o n i n h i s book on " q u a n t i t a t i v e 
t r e n d s " , complete wi th r e g r e s s i o n s and p l o t s . However, when look ing a t i t 
c a r e f u l l y , t he s t a t i s t i c a l work done t u r n s out t o be r a t h e r s l o p p y . Apart 
from the f a c t t h a t many of h i s r e f e r e n c e s a r e not used , wrong or con-
t r a d i c t o r y (without any mentioning of i t ) he comes up wi th e s t ima tes -which 
he c la ims were"ca l cu l a t ed on the b a s i s of annual growth r a t e given by t h e 
Cen t r a l S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e " . In f a c t he uses the y e a r l y growth r a t e s 
provided t o us by T r i , rounding them off t o : 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
103 107 108 102 108 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t h i s s e r i e s of e s t i m a t e s a r e q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t from o u r s . One can f u r t h e r imagine t h a t subsequent c a l c u l a t i o n s 
on t h e p a r t i t i o n i n C and I (on t h e b a s i s of in themselves not very r e l i -
a b l e s h a r e s ) in t h e Na t iona l Income aggrava t e t h e s t a t i s t i c a l e r r o r s 
.Hung's s e r i e s a r e : 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Nat ional Income: 2624 2869 3352 3453 3694 3990 4070 4395 
F i n a l l y , t o be as compl-ete as p o s s i b l e h e r e , a more r e c e n t s o u r c e , La 
R'D'Viet Nam(1975) g ives a s e r i e s of i nd i ce s t h a t only d i f f e r s s l i g h t l y 
from T r i ' s . The va lues fo r the yea r s 1962-1964 (1957=100) a r e : 
1962 1963 1964 
152 154 168 
c S e e : Kinh Te Vie t Nam(1960), p .269,which p r e s e n t s the fo l lowing t a b l e , 
adding t h a t i f the sha r e of fo re ign a id i s inc luded t h e accumulat ion i s 
24.6 % i n 1957 , 20.7 % i n 1958 and 19.1 % i n 1959 : 
I Accum. {%) Gons. (%) 
1957 2,580.7 302.6 11.7 2,278.1 88.3 
1958 2 ,892 .6 397.08 13-7 2 ,495.52 86.3 
1959 3 ,330.6 -455.15 13.7 2 ,875 .4 86 .3 
( m i l l i o n s of B ,wi th sha res given fo l lowing t h e a b s o l u t e f i g u r e s r a t h e r 
than the o the r way a r o u n d ) . i n d i c a t i n g t h a t ' a ccumula t ion ' in t h e t a b l e i s 
i n f a c t ' domes t i c s a v i n g s ' . 
I f we t ake the s h a r e s from the Nat iona l Income f i g u r e s of NNXDKTVH we could 
s t i l l get around 24.2 %, 20.9 % , 19 .0 % r e s p . , which i s only a smal l 
d i f f e r e n c e . 
3 A n n e e s . . ( 1 9 5 9 ) , p . 4 4 g ives us as s h a r e fo r domestic accumula t ion again a 
d i f f e r e n t f i g u r e , namely 14.08 % ( for 1957) , and even 26.14 % i f fo re ign 
a id i s inc luded ( " p r o v i s i o n a l d a t a " ) . 
See: Tr i (1967) ,P .522 , fo r 1957-1963 : 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
(%) : 11.0 14.5 19.2 TSTÏÏ 18.4 17.3 17.0(*) 
( * ) : " p r o v i s i o n a l d a t a " ; 
Th i s sugges t s t h a t from 1959 onwards fo re ign a id was inc luded in t h e 
' accumula t ion r a t e ' , p o s s i b l y because s i n c e t h a t year a s u b s t a n t i a l change 
i n t h e composi t ion of t h a t a id took p l ace towards a much g r e a t e r emphasis 
on producer goods and a much sma l l e r component of consumer goods and even 
raw m a t e r i a l s . ( S e e : T r i ( 1 9 6 7 ) , p . 5 5 7 ) ; 
Nguyen Lang(1972) ,p .26 , who fo l lows T r i ' s growth index for 1960, e x p l i c i t l y 
says tha t in t h a t p a r t i c u l a r year ' i n t e r n a l accumula t ion ' was 18.4 % of 
Na t iona l Income. With the economie c r i s i s t h a t took p l ace one can h a r d l y 
imagine t h a t t h i s was indeed t h e c a s e . 
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Hung(1977),p.108, in s p i t e of half a page of other references , uses in fact 
ö these f igures , without even re fe r r ing to the par t i cu la r page in T r i ' s work. 
"See: Lavallee(1971),p.117 ( who in a number of cases had addit lonal infor-
mation from the Vietnamese Economie I n s t i t u t e for the years 1963-64).Hung 
gives here 17.0 % and 17.0 % r e s p . without specifying h i s source ,while at 
f the same time including Lavallee (amongst others) as one of h is sourcesO) ; 
While for 1957-59 shares of 'domestic savings' in National Income (= 
National Income Produced) have been published , for the other years i t i s 
very d i f f i cu l t to estimate these shares . However, a serious attempt i s made 
here , taking the 'accumulation r a t e ' in the t ab le and comparing i t with 
the National Income and the foreign aid as shown in the budget accounts. 
Apart from the fact that foreign aid may have been higher than s ta ted in 
the budget, there i s another serious d i s to r t ion here , namely the dif-
ference between National Income Produced and National Income Dis t r ibuted . 
All the f igures suggest to the present author that from 1959 onwards the 
'accumulation r a t e ' was given as S+F/Y(P) which i s obviously not correct as 
i t should have been S+F/Y(D). Therefore , the given shares must be handled 
with care , although the main l i ne of development i s not r ea l ly affected 
very much. 
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Although Vietnamese data are too incomplete to draw any def in i te conclu-
s ions , we have t r i ed to advance in ana ly t ica l and empirical terms on the 
issue how large accumulation was and how i t was financed. In the notes to 
t ab le 3 sometimes c r i t i c i sm i s expressed on the way other authors handle the 
Vietnamese da ta . The same data are revalued careful ly and addi t ional impor-
tant data are presented which have not been used un t i l now. 
Two in te res t ing features are to be seen immediately. F i r s t l y , domestic 
savings , which went up in wake of the land reform and the f i r s t f u l l year 
of cooperat ivizat ion (1958-59), decreased considerably u n t i l 1963. only to 
s t a b i l i z e somewhat then. Secondly, foreign finance (as taken from the budget 
accounts) within accumulation (S+F), i s subs tan t i a l ly larger than has been 
estimated un t i l now , inversely increasing i t s share in comparison with 
domestic savings. We wil l discuss both features in de t a i l below. 
Adressing ourselves f i r s t to our estimates on domestic savings , we can see 
an increase from 11.7 % in 1957 to 13.7 % in the years 1958 and 1959 (see: 
tab le 3 ) . In those two years the general economie s i tua t ion improved con-
s iderably , in large measure because of two consecutive good agr i cu l tu ra l 
years . The rapidly expanding domestic demand for food could therefore be met 
while for other 'bas ic needs' imports under aid agreements in pa r t i cu la r 
'eased off' the tension between consumption and accumulation. In 1957 no 
l e s s than 50 % of foreign aid was spend on imports of consumer goods and raw 
mater ia ls while t h i s was s t i l l 48.9 % and 39.2 % in the following two 
48 years , with a decreasing share for consumer goods and an increasing share 
for raw mater ia ls (of which a subs tan t ia l part was used for domestic con-
sumer goods production) .Another factor explaining the shor t - l ived increased 
domestic savings r a t e i s the soc i a l i s a t i on drive during these years , which 
brought S ta te and cooperative control over pr iva te cap i ta l in many sectors 
and branches of the economy. With the economie crisis in 1960 , which, as I 
49 have discussed in detail elsewhere , was partly the consequence of the 
'leap forward' in industrialization , the (too) rapid cooperativization 
process and neglect of the sectors of agriculture and handicrafts , combined 
with the continued high rate of growth of the population (3.5 %) , it is not 
29 
surpr is ing that domestic savings decreased. In fact a close look at the 
balance of trade and the spending of foreign aid reveals a sudden drop in 
imports of consumer goods and raw mater ials during t h i s year, which means 
that domestic production of consumer goods had to make up for previously 
50 imported products .On the other hand during 1961-1962 there was a rapid 
increase . i n • the imports of capi ta l goods in the form of complete fac tor ies 
or equipment. In sp i t e of an increased procurement of agr icu l tu ra l products 
by the Sta te (through tax payments in kind and quota sa les against low 
purchasing pr ices) af ter the formation of the agr icu l tu ra l producer coopera-
t ives , Wie production of surplus by these and other cooperatives was s t i l l 
very low and in many cases probably even non-^existent .The near constancy of 
the accumulation r a t e i s therefore quite deceiving , as domestic savings 
went down rapidly t o the level of an estimated j u s t more than 7 $ in 1963 » 
the year in which to our understanding another economie( 'procurement ')crisis 
can be observed ,which could only be bff -se t in the short run by 'emergency 
imports ' of raw mater ials and consumer goods having at the same time di rect 
consequences for the economie pol ic ies pursued. 
In our discussion of the budget we have already noted tha t foreign finance 
was probably larger than accounted for .This means that in t ab le 3 the ac-
cumulation r a t e could be subs tanta l ly higher than estimated on the basis of 
budget accounts and o f f i c i a l figures on accumulation. In any case we can 
draw from table 3 the important conclusion that foreign finance thrcughout 
51 -u the decade has been the backbone for accumulation in the economy JData on 
foreign aid to the DRV have to be t rea ted with the utmost ca re . When compar-
ing published data on separate foreign aid agreements, t o t a l figures of 
foreign aid and external finance mentioned in the budget a l l are different 
and even there i s substant ia l difference between several o f f i c ia l N-
Vietnamese sources themselves. This problem has been discussed by the 
present author elsewhere , so here we wi l l confine ourselves to the most 
important conclusions. F i r s t l y , the most frequently used figures on foreign 
aid (amongst others by Vo Nhan Tri) i r e 2,468.3 mil l ion Bong for 1955-1960 
and 1,762.5 mil l ion Bong for 1961-1965, including both received aid as well 
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as earmarked a id , the second period almost ce r t a in ly covering only up t i l l 
1963/64 , and not including the new aid agreements signed ear ly in 1965 
af ter the s t a r t of the US-bombing.Secondly, estimated figures on the budget 
for foreign aid do not add up to more than respect ively 1,554 and 1,487 
mil l ion Bong for these periods , hence subs tan t i a l ly l e s s . This could be 
par t ly explained by the mentioned "hidden" par ts of revenue out of foreign 
aid in the budget.Thirdly, comparing aggregate data on foreign aid in domes-
t i c currency and those publishèd in foreign currency ( Rouble and ¥uan) with 
the o f f i c i a l exchange ra tes , one can be ce r ta in that the l a t t e r were not 
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used in p r ac t i c e , implying a subs tan t ia l overvaluation of the Bong . In 
general therefore ,the ro le of foreign aid in the accumulation process has 
been heavily underestimated. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
(1) 
In the ten years of r e l a t i ve peace which have been analysed above the budget 
became rapidly the main instrument of the State in r ed i s t r i bu t ing National 
Income in support of a Sta te control led accumulation process. Budgetary 
revenue , in the f i r s t few years s t i l l la rgely dependent on agr icu l tu ra l 
taxes (paid in kind) soon res ted on di rect rece ip ts from the Sta te sector 
i t s e l f , through budget t ransfers of Sta te en t e rp r i s e s . I t i s in te res t ing to 
see that t h i s generated surplus came pa r t i cu la r ly from the commercial sector 
, both domestic and foreign trade , through price d i f f e ren t i a l s and prof i t 
t r a n s f e r s . In t h i s way the agr icu l tu ra l sector was ce r ta in ly ind i rec t ly 
taxed. Budgetary expenditure concentrated on investment programmes , current 
expenditure within the rapidly expanding State sector (the wage b i l l for 
example , any lossea covered in Sta te enterpr ises and food subs id i e s ) , 
socia l programmes .defence and l a s t but not l e a s t since the ear ly 1960s the 
servicing of the foreign debt (in sp i t e of the very soft conditions under 
which loans were granted) . Altogether the expansionary policy was accom-
panied with an insuffucient growth of domestic revenue which ,as we have 
shown , in i t s e l f was par t ly dependent on p ro f i t s made on imported goods. 
Hence a growing f i s ca l gap was the consequence , only to 'be financed by 
increased foreign a id . 
(2) 
The investment policy which was developed gave great p r io r i t y to industry , 
from 1959 onwards mainly to heavy industry , while l igh t industry , hand-
i c ra f t s and agr icu l tu re (the coopératives and the s t i l l exis t ing pr ivate 
sec tor ) were neglected. Large projects , often i l l -p lanned and with long 
gesta t ion periods, had preference which led to a cer ta in investment tension 
to the detriment of the development of medium and small scale p ro jec t s . The 
celebrated 'walking on two l egs ' formula was never abandoned but in pract ice 
the legs were quite unequal in s i z e . Investment policy was dominated by an 
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accumulation bias towards the newly developing modern Sta te sector , par-
t i c u l a r l y in manufacturing industry but also in ag r i cu l t u r e . State farms 
although contr ibut ing very l i t t l e to production increase swallowed up an 
important share of the investment funds. This rather unbalanced s t ra tegy for 
economie growth led already towards the midst of the FFYP to d i sequ i l ib r i a , 
pa r t i cu la r ly not iceable in s l o w growth in the sec tors of agr icu l ture and 
consumer goods production. 
(3) 
A passive c red i t policy , in which^rapidly growing c r ed i t s were provided for 
working cap i ta l (with l i t t l e provisions for repayment) combined with a 
ra ther uncontrolled growth of the money supply in order to cover for in -
creasing government de f i c i t s caused a disturbing disequilibrium between the 
money in c i r cu la t ion and the goods and services supplied. A growing tension 
between consumer demands and supply of consumer goods and raw mater ials 
could in the f i r s t years s t i l l be 'eased off' by large imports. However 
,with the imports of more and more capi ta l goods shortages of consumer 
goods and consequently black market c i r c u i t s and in f l a t ion became a problem. 
for the DRV government. In s p i t e of the money reform in 1959 a rad ica l 
change in the a l loca t ion and the use of c red i t s did-not s u b s t a n t i a t e . Sta te 
indus t r ies and commercial enterpr ises forged on a large sca le the rules and 
regulat ions by withholding cash and buying and se l l i ng in secundary 
c i r c u i t s . Another consequence of both the system of 'adminis t ra t ive manage-
ment' and of the c red i t policy was the 'playing safe ' a t t i t ude enterpr ise 
managers developed which led to s tockp i l ing . 
(4) 
Although in the data on the Sta te budget the share of foreign aid i s on 
average l e s s than one quarter of t o t a l revenue , arguments have been 
presented that foreign aid in fact was much more important that i s suggested 
by o f f i c i a l publ ica t ions . Undervaluation of the foreign currency , the 
hiding of par ts of foreign aid in the prof i t t ransfe rs to the domestic 
budget revenue and unrecorded foreign aid , a l l lead to the con>.lusion that 
foreign aid was the backbone for accumulation during the period analysed. A 
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further analysis of the share of domestic savings in overall accumulation 
shows that collectivisation hardly contributed to increasing the domestic 
savings rate. In fact after an initial increase following the land reform , 
domestic savings as a share of National Income decrêased rapidly during the 
first four years of the FFYP to a level of around ko % of recorded total 
accumulation. However , it seems justified to suggest that actual accumula-
tion was higher than presented in the statistics , with an even greater 
share of foreign aid in it. 
Although the importance of foreign aid should be emphasized and its positive 
and crucial role must be acknowledged , negative sides can be mentioned as 
well. A growing foreign trade gap could only be financed by this foreign aid 
, and although conditions for extending loans (mainly from China and the 
Soviet Union ) were very soft indeed , the repayment of the debt became an 
increasingly pressing issue during the FFYP. A certain 'import mentality' in 
which foreign aid is believed to cover for any shortage , was certainly 
present as a consequence of this external dependency that had come to exist 
, in spite of the self reliance ideology of the DRV leadership. 
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3 Annees . . (1959) ,p .118 ,on s t a t e procurement: 
1955 1956 1957 
taxes 652,982 336,812 352,063 
purchase 28,720 195,941 232,349 
t o t a l s 681,702 532,753 584,412 
V.S .Ras torguyev(1965) ,p .44 ; Pham Gia K inh (1964) ,p .55 . 
jj V.S.Rastorguyev(1965) , p . 46 ; Nhan Dan , 3 / 3 / 1 9 6 4 , p . 3 . 
In 1963 a l s o "the quota r a t e s were f i xed for a t h r e e - y e a r pe r iod .on t h e 
b a s i s of the 1961-62 a v e r a g e ; s e e C h a r r i e r e ( 1 9 6 6 ) , p . 3 1 and 
White(1985) ,p.101 . 
Nhan Dan,2/11/1963 , p . 1 , r e p o r t e d a p r i c e i n c r e a s e of 20 t o 25 %. I have 
es t ima ted e l sewhere t h a t i n 1964 paddy procurement ( taxes ,quotas and above 
quota s a i e s ) reached a peak of 20.6 % of gross t o t a l paddy output (Spoor, 
r (1985) , p . 4 0 ) . Cha r r i e re (1966) and White(1985) sugges t h igher f i g u r e s . 
V .S .Ras torguyev(1965) ,pp .45-46 . 
o Etudes Vie tnamiennes(1970) ,p .164 confirms t h i s po in t of view. 
V .S .Ras to rguyev(1965) ,p .39 . 
y
 I b i d . 
]?Pham Gia K inh (1964) ,p .55 . 
V.S.Rastorguyev(1965) , P . 4 1 ; Pham Gia K inh (1964) ,p .58 . 
vfith t h e money reform v a s t amounts of cash ho ld ings were d i scovered i n 
S t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s ( s e e no te 3 5 ) , whi le i n 1961, dur ing a n a t i o n a l inven-
t o r y , one d i scovered " t h a t s t o c k - p i l e s of meta ls ( c a s t M r o n , s t e e l , 
eoppe r , l e a d , aluminium, z i n c and t i n ) and s t o r e d t imber a r e voluminous, 
s u r p a s s i n g by f a r our es t imates" (Nghien Cuu Kinh Te,no .3( 1961); JPRS-MO,891 
, p p . 5 0 - 5 4 ) . 
Chr .White (1985) , p . 9 8 , i n c o r r e c t l y s a y s : "Most s t r i k i n g l y , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t 
t h a t Vietnam i s p r i m a r i l y an a g r i c u l t u r a l country , i t i s t he p r o f i t s of 
the s ta te -owned i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r which have s u p p l i e d t h e overwhemling 
m a j o r i t y of domest ic budget revenues".We w i l l show i n f a c t i t was t h e 
..commercial s t a t e s e c t o r who did so and not the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . 
' v u Ngoc Khue(1963) ,p .30 . 
Vu Ngoc Khue(1963) ,p .26 , comes a l s o t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , which was a i r e a d y 
hypo thes ized by the p r e sen t au thor look ing a t t he budget and fo re ign a i d 
l6figures. 
1?See: Spoor(1985),Ch.4 for a detailed discussion. 
Nam Nam..(1960),pp.169,213; Vietnamese Studies(1976).pp.207*8; Vo Nhan Tri 
1 8 ( 1 9 6 7 ) , P . 3 2 2 . 
, -E tudes Vie tnamiennes (1967) ,p .161 . 
I am indeb ted t o Michael Ellman for p o i n t i n g out t o me t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
? n s i g n i f i c a n c e of a budget d e f i c i t i n a s t a t e s o c i a l i s t economy. 
ffio Lieu Thong Ke(1963) ,p .67 . 
I t i s most ly unders tood t h a t t he North Vietnamese s t r a t e g y was a good 
example of the "mixed choice of t e c h n i q u e s " s t r a t e g y . See fo r example: 
Tran Ngoc Bich(1972) . He c la ims a l s o t h a t t h e r e was an e s s e n t i a l l y 
' ba l anced g rowth ' (p .76) , but f a i l s t o provide any s u b s ' a n t i a l evidence f o r 
h i s p o s i t i o n . 
2fM.Ellman(1979), pp.119*128. 
-
5Hung(1977) ,P.142 : 53 %, based on u n f o r t u n a t e l y q u i t e er roneous 
c a l c u l a t i o n s . I .Norlund(1984) ,p .95 ,who reproduces Hung's f i g u r e s , does 
not mention t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s h a r e , but g ives l a t e r i n t h e a r t i c l e t h e 
planned one : 48.5 %. 
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Based on several Vietnamese r e p o r t s . Recent Vietnamese s t a t i s t i c s , pub-
l ished in Ba Nam Phat Tr ien . . (1978) , tend to overs ta te the growth in 
numbers(p .73; compare with Spoor(1985),p.96). 
2gThanh t ien . . (1960) ,p .36; So Lieu Thong Ke(l963),P.47. 
Hung(1977) ,p.80, argues that t h i s was a sh i f t "from emphasis on heavy 
industry to s t ress ing the importance of agr icul ture and l igh t industry" , 
as in China during the l a s t two years of the FFYP. Looking at h is own 
estimates of indus t r i a l investments th i s was cer ta in ly not the case . 
According to our understanding 'pol icy in ten t ions ' were cer ta in ly not put 
' into p rac t i ce ' here . 
2gSpoor(1.985),p.39. 
Griff i t tWones (1981) i s a subs tan t ia l contribution to the debate about the 
ro le of money in t h e ' t r a n s i t i o n s to soc ia l i sm ' . I t seems that in the 
Vietnamese case t h i s ro le was rather contradic tory. In expanding rapidly 
short term c red i t s to the s t a t e and cooperative trading sec to r , market 
control indeed increased. However, lack of supply of essen t ia l consumer 
goods and agr i cu l tu ra l implements caused increasing divergence between 
money in c i rcu la t ion and goods on the market. This rather active ro l e of 
money i s in sharp cont ras t with the passive or conservative a t t i t ude to 
üsing c red i t s to s t imulate production (in financing pa r t i cu la r ly addit ions 
„q to fixed c a p i t a l ) . 
^Kinh Te Viet Nam(1960) ,p.31 ; Tran Duong and Pham Tho(1960),p.70. 
^V.S.Rastorguyev(1965),p.72. 
A very s imilar monetary operation took place in China in 1955, when the 
Muan changed in value, with an even more d ras t i c exchange r a t e of 
_ ? 1 :10 ,000 . 
riV.S.Rastorguyev(1965) ,p.78. 
^Tran Duong and Pham Tho(1960),pp.120-121 . 
fLlbid. ; The urban population share i s taken from Nam Nam. .(1960) ,p .71 . 
The c i t a t i on i s taken from V.S.Rastorguyev(1965),p.80; The or ig ina l 
_,sources i s : Tran Duong and Pham Tho(1960),p.125. 
Tran Duong(1962), pp.131-132; Nguyen Lang(1972) gives somewhat deviant 
„ d a t a . 
According to Chr.White(1985),the strong r i s e in prices on the free market 
took place primarely af ter the bombing had s t a r t ed in 1965. However, 
already during the second half of the FFYP repor ts were made public 
c r i t i c i s i n g the "wide spread c icula t ion of fraudulant goods in free 
„markets" .(See: Nhan Dan, 30/3/1964,p.3 for a good example). 
^V.S.Rastorguyev(1965) ,p.102. 
^Tran Linh Son(1962) ,p . 5 . 
IjljTong Nghiep (Industry) ,no.22,16/1 /1960;JPRS-5013,P.49. 
I t i s i n t e res t ing to make a comparison with what R.W.Davies(1958),p.158 
wrote on c red i t policy in the Soviet Union: 
Bank policy had to s tee r a d i f f i cu l t course.Too much credi t would lead 
to overstocking and waste; too l i t t l e c red i t would lead to hold^ups in 
production from understocking. Too l i t t l e bank control over the finances 
of enterpr ises would tempt them to depart from the plan; too great a 
ü ? control would deprive management of i n i t i a t i v e . 
According to 3 Annees..(1959),p.134, c red i t to the pr ivate sector in 
agr icu l ture went down from 15,970,000 ©(1956) to only 946,000 B(1957), 
while in industry and handicraft the decrease was from 8,253,000 © to 
3,498,000 ©. Nguyen Lang(1972),p.25 gives another impression. According to 
him un t i l 1957 a l l c red i t s went to individual peasants and in the years 
1958-1960 t h i s share went down to 62.5 %(1958); 17.6 56(1959) and 10.8 
$(1960). An important qua l i f ica t ion he makes i s that ' individual peasants 
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continued to receive a id , but in the form of"col lect ive loans" per group 
of famil ies*. 
Bulletin d'Information du Comité Central du Parti Travailleur du Vietnam, 
.uno.8-9(Ha-noi,1961),pp.6-7. 
^ Nguyen Lang(1972),p.27. 
Le Chau(1966),p.303, for example uses an incorrect def in i t ion of material 
accumulation, namely the t o t a l accumulated fixed asse t s ,compared with the 
...National Income of a par t i cu la r year. 
kj.Wilczynski(1977),n.78. 
I.Norlund(1984) does no more than repeat T r i ' s f igures (which are eer -
.o ta in ly not without contradict ions and question marks). 
JqVo Nhan Tr i ( l967) ,p .557. 
^Spoor(1985) ,Ch.I . 
^Spoor(1985),Ch.IV. 
Hung(1977),p.89; L.Lavallee(1971),p.119, says that "towards 1964" foreign 
aid formed about 50 % of in te rna l accumulation, without giving good 
reasoning for t h i s statement. He uses in fact also T r i ' s f igures on a id . 
Chr.White(1985) refers also to L.Lavallee. Hung calculated that during the 
TYP 62 % and during the FFYP 34 % of planned investment was financed by 
foreign resources . However , these estimates do not reveal tha t i t con-
cerns here planned (bet ter : expected) foreign finance re la ted to planned 
(and not rea l ized) investment. To give an example of the range of inac-
curacy , Hung gives 5,100 mil l ion Dong as planned investment for the FFYP 
(=1,020 mil l ion D/annum).He does not say that in 1963 t h i s planned f igure 
had already been lowered to another planned f igure of 3,883 mil l ion Dong 
(=777 mil l ion D/annum) while rea l ized investment during the f i r s t four 
^„years of the FFYP was around 733 mil l ion Dong. 
Spoor(1985) ,Ch.IV, for further d e t a i l s . 
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— — 4 2 24 6 93 25 115 25 
67 100 212 100 395 100 371 100 461 100 
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Annex 
A C r i t i c a l S t a t i s t i c a l Note on I n d u s t r i a l Inves tments 
Nguyen Tien Hung(1977),p.142 , g ives the fo l lowing t a b l e on 'Budgetary 
investment in i n d u s t r y 1955-71 ' for the DRV, in m i l l i o n of Bong ,annual 
averages and cons t an t 1959 p r i c e s . 
" I n d u s t r y Group/ 1955-57 1958-60 1961-64 1965-68 1969-71 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
Group A 
Group B 
Total 
Cen t ra l Admin. 
Regional " 
Tota l 
Investment in i n d u s t r y as % of t o t a l development investment : 
Group A 20 31 41 27 30 
Group B 11 " 1 5 12 6 10 
Tota l 31 46 53 33 40 
Sources :So Lieu Thong Ke ,1955- l959(Ha-no i ,1960) ,p .99 ; So Lieu Thong Ke,1967 
(Ha-noi,1967),p.13;DRVN,La Republique Democratique du Vietnam (Ha-
n o i , ELE,1975) ,pp.67,76-79; Etudes Vie tnamiennes ,no .44 ,1976 ,p .196 ; 
Leon Laval lee .L 'Economie du Nord Vietnam (Paris ,CERM,1971),p.58. " 
A c a r e f u l look a t the va r ious sources (which we have used widely in our 
a r t i c l e above ) , r e v e a l s the fo l lowing s t r i k i n g examples of the inaccuracy of 
t h i s ( impor tan t ) t a b l e : 
The f i g u r e s Hung gives as being a b s o l u t e a r e no t publ i shed as such in t h e 
sources he u s e s , but a r e s imply c a l c u l a t e d on t h e b a s i s of (a) the growth 
i nd i ce s publ i shed by La R 'D 'Vie t Nam(1975),pp.76-79 and t h e annual average 
for 1955-57 i s taken from n i s f i r s t source (which i s t he same as Nam 
Nam. . ( 1 9 6 0 ) ) . Immediately Hung makes t h r e e mis takes :f i r s t l y , t h e '1955—57 
annual average i s 64.8 and not 67 m i l l i o n B; secondly , t h e same source 
g ives on page 103 a c a r e fu l d i v i s i o n i n t o Group A, Group B and l o c a l 
i n d u s t r y g i v i n g averages of 43.8 (A) , 20 (B) and 1 ( l o c a l ) ; t h i r d l y , and 
more grave than the previous ones , t he annual average for the fo l lowing 
per iod 1958-60 was i n f a c t not 212 m i l l i o n Bong but cons ide rab ly l e s s , 
b a s i c a l l y because 1960 was a ' c r i s i s yea r ' and planned f i g u r e s were f a r 
above r e a l i z e d f i g u r e s . According t o So Lieu Thong Ke(1963)> the annual 
average for 1958-1960 would come t o 190.4 m i l l i o n B (see t a b l e 2 ) , whi le 
another Vietnamese source .Nghien Cuu Kinh Te , August 1963(16),p . 8 1 , even 
comes t o 179.5 m i l l i o n B , a f i g u r e one can f i n d in a source which i s c i t e d 
_by Hung himself , namely L a v a l l e e ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 5 8 . 
The outcomes for 1958-60 (as mentioned i n no te 1) and for 1961-64 a r e much 
h ighe r than the f i g u r e s t h a t a r e known l a r g e l y in a b s o l u t e form, pub l i shed 
i n d i f f e r e n t sources a t t he epoch. For example ( see t a b l e 2 ) , t he r e a l i z e d 
budgetary investment in i n d u s t r y , annual average fo r 1961-64, i s not 395 
m i l l i o n Bong as Hung c l a i m s , but ' 331.9 m i l l i o n Böng , whi le t h e s h a r e of 
investment in i n d u s t r y in the t o t a l investment was not h igher than 45.3 % 
(Etudes Vietnamiennes even g ives 46 %) , and c e r t a i n l y not 53 %• As in no te 
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1, one cannot escape 'the inconsistency of Hung's figures with that of 
Lavallee(1971)»P.58 , who by the way i s himself mistaken , giving the 
total—--revised--- investment for the FFYP as if i t was a l l indus t r i a l 
,investment. 
'The source which Hung claims to have used ,Etudes Vietnamiennes(1976), can 
not be ef fec t ive ly traced back in n is outcomes. Why ? My assumption i s that 
t h i s par t i cu la r source f i r s t divides the investment in to the categories of 
centra l ly-run and regional i ndus t r i e s , and thereaf ter gives growth indices 
and shares for the central ly-run indust r ies separate ly according to the 
divis ion group A and group B. The Etudes Vietnamiennes figures in fact are 
more in t e r e s t i ng , as on foregoing pages insight i s given in how the 
regional indust r ies were divided in group A and B for receiving budgetary 
investments. 
Hung , in his book which i s fu l l of mistakes (see other notes in t h i s 
a r t i c l e ) , does not care much about the problem of prices or the index 
number problem. Above t h i s t ab le he j u s t puts "1959 constant pr ices" while 
in his sources th i s i s j u s t not clear at a l l , and even more l i k e l y to be 
current p r i ces . Later on , from 1970 onwards the DRV author i t i es would 
change some published figures to a different base (1970=100), but in most 
cases i t i s unknown which prices are used. 
To the eyes of n o n - s t a t i s t i c a l l y t ra ined reader these -points made here may 
seem somewhat i r r e l e v a n t . However, i f growth indices are used to estimate 
absolute outcomes for subsequent years , there i s danger of a mul t ip l ica-
t ion of e r rors and u n r e l i a b i l i t y , which makes the above t ab le in fact 
u se l e s s . This c r i t i c i sm i s impl ic i t ly a lso directed to unc r i t i ca l use of 
t h i s ( or other ) t a b l e s . An example i s Norlund[1984],p.95 ,who c i t e s the 
f i r s t part of the t ab le without any discussion whatsoever of i t s sources 
and actual value, which would have been essen t ia l ,as her a r t i c l e was 
dealing with i ndus t r i a l development in the DRV and the SRV. Hung's figures 
are t r ea ted in a s imilar unc r i t i c a l fashion by Vickerman[1985]. 
